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Abstract 
Economists who talk about free markets seem to ignore that Adam Smith (considered as the father of 
laissez-faire economics) wrote also ; and that Max Weber, the famous sociologist, 
connected hard work and moral values (ethics) with the advance of capitalism. Public policy has to deal with the 
social fallout of unlimited greed, lack of honesty, cynicism, selfishness, etc, which the current financial crisis 
illustrates conspicuously. The actual financial crisis, which has shaken the beliefs of even the most ardent supporters 
of unfettered markets, cannot be explained only by years of cheap money and growing imbalances in the world 
economy. Mistakes in macro-economic policy were accompanied by gross abuses of securitisation, abnormally 
skewed incentives and loss of moral compass, inadequate risk-assessment models and failures to check for systemic 
risks, a breakdown of due diligence and an almost blind belief in the self-regulating virtues of markets.   
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1. Financial markets and some ethical issues 
This crisis points the finger at major weaknesses of a model of economic and business governance, 
with its under-regulation and inadequate supervision, undersupply of public goods (including healthcare, 
infrastructure) as well as a blind belief in the self-healing/equilibrating virtues of markets. The current 
crisis is a heavy indictment of market fundamentalism . 
Some are tempted to see the ongoing financial crisis as a recurrent accident, albeit more severe, along 
an economic cycle and following worldwide very cheap credit for years in a row. But a careful reading 
would go at its structural roots. Globalization of markets and financial engineering, with precarious and, 
frequently, missing regulations, highly skewed incentive schemes, and numerous conflicts of interests, 
have created the milieu for current crisis. 
Financial markets have become increasingly opaque and, identifying those who bear the risk together 
with evaluating it represents formidable tasks. The size of the so-
is lightly or not regulated at all, has been constantly increasing over the last couple of decades. Banks 
themselves have been in a game of highly complex financial products; banks have engaged in more than 
questionable packaging and selling of debt tied to high risk mortgages. Inadequate incentive schemes, 
short-termism and blatant conflicts of interest have increased speculative, casino-type trading. 
 Dubious mortgage credits, based on the idea that an unlimited increase in housing prices would allow 
them to pay their debts, are only the acute symptom of a much broader crisis, which relates to a type of 
financial governance, to a business model. The top three rating agencies in the world were themselves 
interested in investing in the securities they were rating, because of the high commissions they could get. 
And a major investment bank epitomizes a loss of any sense of ethics: it earned billions of USD by 
speculating downwards on subprime securities while selling them to its clients. 
This financial crisis has made more visible the growing income inequalities which have accumulated 
in the past decades . It is worthy to notice that rising income inequality in both the 
US and Europe has gone in tandem with an ever growing financial sector, that seems to have acquired a 
of its own. Since all regulation has practically been abolished in the financial area 
financial assets represent 15 times the total GDP of all countries nowadays. The financial world has 
accumulated a massive amount of fictitious capital, with hardly an improvement for humanity and the 
environment owing to it and it has generated increasing inequalities in favor of those with the power to 
issue this capital. The salaries of those who have adopted a financial and not an industrial rationale, are 
between 300 and 900 times higher than the average salaries of those working for them, whereas in the 
first century and a half of capitalism up until the 1960s, that ratio was at most of 40 to 1. The share of 
direct and indirect wages in the GDP has been steadily decreasing in the last 25 years by 8% to 11% in 
the main industrialized countries. Between 1 and 5 % of the richest part of the population has benefited 
almost exclusively from the increase of half of the GDP in 20 years. It is true that technological progress 
has contributed to rising income inequality (highly skilled labour being favored); but misguided policies 
have had their role, too, in this regard. All of this brings a huge ethical issue to prominence. 
2. The roots of the current crisis  
The main causes of the current financial crisis are to be found at both macro and micro level. An 
analytical classification would identify structural and cyclical factors. 
 
Structural Factors 
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 A dramatic rise in the role of capital markets (non-banking financial institutions) in the financial 
intermediation process. The growing complexity of financial markets has become an issue in itself. 
 An increasing use of new financial instruments (securitisation) which have spread out risks across 
national borders and have made markets more opaque (reduced transparency).  
 Rising opacity of financial markets has accentuated systemic risks. 
 The pressure of globalization and the rise in cross- border operations. Transactions costs have been 
reduced constantly over the last years and, as a consequence, large volume of transaction can be 
carried out in short amounts of time. 
 We may consider that economic and financial globalization is 
financial crisis. It is also relevant John  that globalization is not just a reality to be 
accepted but also has the power to deliver enormous good to humanity. However, owing to ill 
governance system of institutional power houses, flaws policy of inexperienced Westerners has 
unfortunately contributed in to widening poor-rich divide, suffering environment, instable economies, 
commercial 
and financial interests. Stiglitz pinpoints the effective start of the globalization process and promotion 
of the free market ideology in the 1980s (Stiglitz, 2007). 
 Seemingly intractable conflicts of interest among market participants. 
 Inadequate incentive structures (compensation schemes) in the financial industry that have encouraged 
risk-taking at the expense of prudence. 
 An excess of saving in a number of countries, notably China, and the global redistribution of wealth 
and income towards commodities exporting countries. In this regard, we can mention the unusual 
situation of the US economy as the wealthiest and most developed in the world: instead of showing 
high domestic savings and substantial net capital outflows, its savings ratio is stunningly low and it 
relies on foreign capital in order to finance its large current account deficit; we may say that US 
economy is overdriven by consumption. 
 An over-reliance on the self- regulatory virtues of markets. 
 
Cyclical Factors 
 
 Excessively low risk-free interest rates at all maturities in major economies (the US, Euro land and 
Japan). For instance, Taylor (2007) shows that a higher federal rate path would have averted much of 
the housing boom in the US. A higher interest rate would have decreased the supply of funds to the 
mortgage market. The excess liquidity was reinforced by countries with large exports to the US, such 
as China or Asian countries, those who had their domestic currencies pegged to the US dollar or the oil 
and commodities exporting countries which wanted to limit their appreciation of domestic currency 
against the US dollar. 
 An unreasonable low credit risk spread across all instruments. 
 
 Structural factors create the general conditions for potentially generating a crisis while cyclical factors 
are those which help triggering it. The history of financial crises shows in fact, that, with regard to 
cyclical factors, the current turmoil is no different from previous episodes. Thus, it is the gap between 
high returns on capital and the low cost of capital, with irresponsible lending, which sows the seeds for 
financial crises. For instance, Ferguson and Schularick (2007) argue that this gap has been widened over 
the last years due to the recent integration of Asian labour force into the world economy. This has 
increased global returns while the cost of capital was maintained at a low level-as measured by low real 
interest rates. This situation is no different from the Asian crisis (1997) when low yield investment 
opportunities in developed economies made capital from these countries to fly to economies where higher 
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return on capital could have been earned. Eventually, indiscriminate lending led to defaults, bankruptcies 
and, finally, crises. 
 
3. Features of the current crisis 
 One legitimate question to ask is what makes this crisis different. There is a combination of factors 
that have led to the current situation. Some of them are similar to the ones that caused previous recent 
financial crises- as mentioned earlier. However, increased innovation in financial products and their 
growing complexity, together with the failure of regulatory and supervising institutions to keep up with 
those innovations, appear to have created the conditions for this crisis to emerge. Without being 
exhaustive, below are several characteristics that distinguish the current crisis from previous ones. 
3.1. The Shadow  banking    
 Over the past 10-15 years, the financial market model has changed substantially( Blundell-Wignall A., 
Atkinson P., Hoon Lee S, 2008).,  On the one hand, banks have increasingly started to sell their credit risk 
to other investment groups, either via direct loan sales or by repackaging loans into bonds. This process, 
known as securitisation, allows banks to divide up the resulting residential mortgage-backed securities 
and place them in instruments called collateralized debt obligations or CDOs. The latter are then sold to a 
wide range of investors, depending on their appetite for risk. For instance, one set of securities, known as 
an equity tranche, pays the highest returns but is the first to suffer if the underlying bonds default. Other 
securities offer a lower yield but a triple A credit rating, because a lot of defaults would be needed to 
trigger losses. 
 More generally, asset securitisation involves the sale of income generating from various financial 
assets (mortgages, car loans, leases) by a company or bank to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Thanks to 
Enron, SPVs are household words. These entities aren`t bad though. They were originally (and still are) 
used to isolate financial risk. A corporation can use such a vehicle to finance a project without putting 
entire firm at risk. Problem is, due to accounting loopholes, these vehicles became a way for CFOs to hide 
debt. Essentially, it looks like the company doesn`t have a liability when they really do. As we saw with 
Enron bankruptcy, if things go wrong, the results can be devastating.  
 Structures such as Conduit Financing Vehicles (CFVs) or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) 
enable a range of long dated debt instruments to be financed by short-term debt. A SIV is a type of SPV, 
most commonly associated with having CDOs and other longer termed assets. The main benefit of SIVs 
is that they exploit an arbitrage, using higher-rate assets funded by short-term, lower rate, liabilities. SIVs 
are often through which the long-term debt they invest in 
can be funded by short-term debt. Because SIVs conduct their operations through capital markets, being 
often offshore entities, they evade the capital adequacy regulations to which banks are subject to. 
 
market players, it becomes increasingly difficult to assess the nature and the magnitude of the risk 
involved or to locate those who bear the risk. Securitisation of mortgages has spread the financial risks 
around economy in such a way that banks were no longer deemed likely to go bankrupt because of 
holding the bad loans they originated. The repackaging of mortgages in complex collateralized debt 
obligations has made it difficult to identify who is holding what. As a consequence, this has led to fears of 
credit risk among banks when dealing in the interbank lending market, pushing up the spread between 
three-month interbank rates and the policy rate in the US, the UK as well as in the Euro-area. 
 The economic principles of the current crisis are still the same; it is only the market exponents that 
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have chang
were loans, and its short term liabilities were deposits. In the the 
institution could be either a bank or an investment fund whereas the assets could be mortgage-backed 
securities or their derivatives, and the short-term credit is commercial paper. 
 
3.2. The breadth of the crisis and the lack of trust  
 Another salient feature of the current crisis is its extensive breadth across a large spectrum of financial 
market products. Consumer confidence has already been affected beyond the home loan sector. The trend 
on losses on credit card and auto loans is going up. Moreover, mortgage-related losses have started to be 
felt outside the banking sector. For instance, widening credit spreads on senior tranches of structured 
instruments have resulted in making to market losses on the value of insurance written on these products. 
This, in turn, triggered market concerns which increasingly have affected higher-rated products and assets 
other than credit (Fender and Hordahl, 2007). 
 
3.3.  The high level of concentration  
 Concentration has been one of the main characteristic of the structured finance market. In Europe, for 
instance, the structured finance market grew by an impressive 25% in 2005 reaching Euro 450 bn. in 
2006. Over 70% of these deals are structured by 12 banks and the three rating agencies, Fitch, Standard & 
Poor`s and Moody`s cover the whole market (with Standard and Poor`s and Moody`s covering around 
80% of the market.). The high level of concentration has also been identified as one of the main issues 
arising from changes in banking fundamentals in the Institute of International Finance report (2007). 
Nowadays, there are a few large firms which provide a large part of the volume and liquidity in specific 
markets. This aspect raises liquidity issues because of the way in which market players are 
interconnected. 
 
3.4. Extensive leverage on a large scale by some market participants 
 An issue often raised during current debates concerning the causes of today`s crisis refers to a certain 
class of investors and the incidence of their decisions on the financial markets. In recent years, highly 
leveraged vehicles have been very active in foreign exchange transactions as globalization spread and 
opportunities in more traditional markets became scarce due to reduced volatility and low returns. Carry 
trades, a preferred investment choice for hedge funds, for instance, seem to be an important driver of 
cross-border bank lending. This magnifies their exposure to exchange rate fluctuations. One of the 
reasons why hedge funds decisions could have a strong impact on financial markets - even with systemic 
consequences, because of the institutions which are counterparts to hedge fund transactions  is that they 
use a very high leverage, required to ensure a high return on investors `capital. True, so far, systemic risk 
has not been proven in this scenario but if hedge fund activities grow at the current rate it may well 
happen. In favorable times this strategy can multiply returns, but, if market prices move against the 
investment strategy, it also augments risk by the same measure.  
4. Lessons from the crisis and new challenges for economic methodology 
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The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated that financial frictions should be front and 
center in macroeconomic analysis: they no longer could be ignored in the macro-econometric that models 
that central banks use for forecasting and policy analysis, as we saw was the case before the crisis. As a 
result, there is a resurgence of interest in the interaction of finance and macroeconomics. Economists, 
both in academia and in central banks, are now actively trying to rethink methodology they use and to 
build financial frictions into their general equilibrium models, and there is a new literature that is in its 
infancy to explore how financial frictions would modify the prescriptions provided by the science of 
monetary policy( Frederic S. Mishkin, 2011). Even before the crisis there was some research which 
recognized that the dynamic behavior of the economy could exhibit nonlinearities, at least in response to 
some shocks (Hamilton, 1989; Kim and Nelson, 1999;  Kim, Morley, and Piger, 2005). 
Also, most of the quantitative studies monetary policy have also assumed that the shocks hitting 
the economy have a time-invariant Gaussian distribution, that is, a classical bell curve with symmetric 
and well-behaved tails. In reality, however, the distribution of shocks hitting the economy is more 
complex. In some instances, the uncertainty facing the economy is clearly skewed in one direction or 
another; again, this is likely when there are significant financial disruptions. In addition, as we have seen 
in the recent crisis, the shocks hitting the economy may exhibit excess kurtosis, that is, tail risk, because 
the probability of relatively large negative disturbances is higher than would be implied by a Gaussian 
distribution. 
5. Conclusions 
 
 As the current crisis unfolds and the time passes by, it becomes clearer that we are being confronted 
with an event whose implications are bound to be long lasting. It is hard to understand why those in 
charge with regulating markets have been so oblivious to warnings which had been sent by highly 
knowledgeable individuals years ago. Almost a decade ago, reputable economists cautioned against the 
use of derivates that enhance instability and increase systemic risks against the backdrop of global 
 threat to the financial system 
 Addressing the roots of the problem that have triggered this crisis should be of paramount importance. 
In the past, such crises tended to be more localized and were dealt with more easily. The difference this 
time has been in the rapid spread of intense financial innovation, which has occurred during the last 
couple of decades; this allowed dissemination of risks on a large scale at the expense of transparency. As 
a consequence, the emergence of the shadow banking system, largely unregulated and lacking appropriate 
supervision has brought about more opacity in financial markets and has accentuated systemic risk. The 
excessive trust in the self-healing power of markets has not yielded the result some expected. 
 In our opinion, one line of action should, necessarily, be the regulation of the shadow banking system. 
Likewise, the intrinsic workings of the current financial system indicate that banking institutions can no 
longer be separated from the securities markets. Thus, one feasible option would be the creation of 
regulatory framework that would regulate concerned institutions as a whole. 
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